On 21st June, Colombians elected right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella to succeed leftist President Gustavo Petro, after the closest presidential runoff in the country’s history. De la Espriella won by a margin of just 250,000 votes, securing 49.66% of the vote. His victory marks a sharp reversal from Petro’s 2022 election, when Petro became Colombia’s first left-wing president, and signals a decisive shift in voter sentiment after a period of left-leaning rule.
The result follows a wider pattern across South and Central America, where recent elections have reinforced the impression of a regional shift to the right. Outcomes in Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, and Costa Rica suggest that voters are increasingly backing candidates who promise stronger security, economic discipline and a break from left-wing incumbents. With Brazil’s October election expected to be closely contested, Latin America is showing a clear tendency towards the right.
The political shift is already visible in foreign policy. Several newly-elected governments have sought closer alignment with the United States, whilst signalling greater distance from Cuba, Russia, Iran, and to a lesser extent, China. For Washington, this creates an opportunity to rebuild influence in a region where left-wing governments have often pursued more independent or openly anti-American foreign policies. Security cooperation, counter-narcotics, migration management, energy and critical minerals are all likely to feature more prominently in renewed U.S. engagement.
China, however, complicates this picture. Even leaders who are ideologically closer to Washington cannot easily distance themselves from Beijing. China has become one of South America’s most important trading partners and a major source of investment in infrastructure, energy, mining and technology. For economies dependent on exports of oil, copper, lithium, soy, beef and other commodities, Chinese demand remains central to economic growth.
This creates a strategic tension for the region’s new right-leaning governments. Politically, many may want to deepen ties with the United States and distance themselves from authoritarian partners. Economically, however, they continue to depend on Chinese markets, finance and infrastructure investment. As Washington has found in its own efforts to reduce dependence on China, decoupling is far easier to promise than to deliver. For South American economies, whose growth often depends on commodity exports and foreign capital, the challenge is even greater.
The result is unlikely to be a clean choice between Washington and Beijing. Instead, many governments will try to balance both: strengthening security and diplomatic ties with the United States while preserving commercial relations with China. This balancing act could become one of the defining features of Latin American geopolitics over the next few years.
Handled carefully, this competition could work to the region’s advantage. As the U.S. and China compete for influence, South and Central American governments may gain more leverage to attract investment, negotiate better terms and develop strategic sectors. Natural resources will be central to this contest. Lithium, copper, rare earth minerals, hydrocarbons and agricultural exports are all critical to global supply chains and the energy transition, increasing the region’s strategic importance.
The challenge will be ensuring that Latin America does not simply become a battleground for great-power competition. If the region’s new leaders can use renewed U.S. interest and continued Chinese demand to their advantage, the rightward shift could bring not only a change in ideology, but a stronger bargaining position for Latin America on the world stage.
However, this growing leverage may also carry consequences for Europe and the UK. If critical minerals become increasingly tied to U.S.-China rivalry, global prices could rise and supply chains could become more fragmented. This is already a concern for the UK Government, which has warned that domestic demand for cooper is expected to nearly double by 2035, while lithium demand could increase more than tenfold. For British businesses and policymakers, particularly in clean energy, electric vehicles, defence, advanced manufacturing and food supply chains, Latin America’s rising strategic importance could therefore bring both opportunities and risks.