Gorton and Denton’s political geography made it an almost perfect test of Labour’s ability to hold its electoral coalition together, with growing pressure on both its left and right flanks. Reform UK expected to perform strongly in the predominantly white, working-class parts of the constituency, while the Greens posed the sharper threat in the leafier, more gentrified suburban areas, as well as among students and some more diverse communities. It brought together, in one contest, several of the electoral tensions shaping Labour’s wider predicament.
Former Chief of Staff Morgan McSweeney’s original post-2024 approach rested on the assumption that progressive voters would largely fall in behind Labour to block Reform. But as McSweeney’s influence began to wane, Labour started to place more emphasis on shoring up its left flank directly.
Gorton and Denton was one of the first real tests of that shift in strategy.
In the end, the result was clear. The Greens outperformed expectations, pushed Labour into third place, and dismantled the framing Labour had spent the entire campaign constructing. Subsequent reporting has also suggested discomfort within Labour itself about the tone of the campaign, with criticism that the attack lines were both overly negative and misleading.
The strategy that failed
Labour fought the by-election on two arguments: first, that this was a straight fight between Labour and Reform and second that the Greens were too extreme to be taken seriously. Using some highly questionable bar charts (though Labour was hardly alone on that front), the message was that a vote for the Greens was wasted and risked letting Reform through the middle and, alongside that, Labour tried to paint the Greens as radical, with repeated attacks on Zack Polanski’s drugs policy, presented in crude and sensational terms as support for “legalising all drugs”.
It was clear from the result that neither of these messages landed.
Yet, rather than retreating from that position, Keir Starmer appeared to reinforce it in the aftermath, warning MPs that Labour would continue to highlight both the Greens’ “extreme policies” and the risk of splitting the progressive vote. Some Labour MPs were said to be exasperated by the letter, and with good reason – doubling down on the failed Gorton and Denton strategy would undoubtedly be a mistake.
Who these lost voters actually are
Labour did correctly identify that voters drifting to the Greens are not necessarily lost for good, but it failed to devise a strategy to appeal to them. Research from More in Common, prior to the by-election, suggested Green growth is being driven in significant part by former Labour voters, many of whom have switched since the general election.
But those voters are, generally, not leaving because they want a more radical left-wing offer. They are leaving because Labour has not persuaded them that it is delivering meaningful change, particularly on the cost of living and on its broader promises of national renewal.
Exit polling from Gorton and Denton reinforces that point. This was a fluid electorate, with many voters making up their minds late in the campaign. Labour was not confronting a settled anti-Labour bloc. Even late into the campaign, it was speaking to voters who were still open to Labour, but who ended up unconvinced by what it had to say.
That has a clear strategic implication. Labour’s path back is not closed, but it depends on understanding the character of Green support more accurately.
More in Common’s analysis suggests Green backing is real, but not yet fully consolidated. Many voters are open to the party, but fewer are deeply attached to it, and its supporters are among the least likely to turn out. That means Labour is still dealing with an electorate it can win back. But it also means those voters will not be won back simply by being told that the alternative is worse.
What a better strategy looks like
Labour’s Greens strategy must be centred on delivery, not the hope of being the least worst option.
If these voters are drifting because Labour feels too much like continuity, the answer is to make Labour feel distinct again through visible action on the issues that bind this coalition together: living standards, housing, the NHS and climate.
Labour is already doing a number of things that should have cut-through here, from boosting employment and renters’ rights, renationalising the railways, insulating homes, and investing in renewable energy. The problem is that it did not make that positive case in Gorton and Denton with anything like the confidence it should have.
A tactical ‘squeeze’ message still has a place within that, especially where Reform is a credible threat. Labour is right to think that some Green-leaning voters may think pragmatically in those circumstances and vote tactically, but that argument can only ever be secondary. Used on its own, it repeats the same mistake made in Gorton and Denton by asking for progressive support on the basis of fear alone.
The danger of drawing the wrong lessons
Labour also needs to avoid drawing the wrong conclusions from this very particular result. Gorton and Denton was, undoubtedly, a ‘worst of all worlds’ seat for Labour to contest. Not every seat will present the same challenge or require the same response.
Labour still needs to hold together a broad coalition if it is to win again in 2029, including softer Reform switchers as well as disillusioned progressive voters. So the answer is not to lurch into a different kind of politics altogether, or to mimic Green rhetoric that it cannot sustain in office.
The answer is to make a stronger, more confident case for Labour as a purposeful, reforming government, one that can speak to both sets of voters without abandoning either.
Gorton and Denton showed that Labour cannot scare progressive voters back into line; Labour has to persuade them that they are worth voting for.