Northern Ireland’s political journey
To understand why devolution in Northern Ireland is so fragile, it helps to remember that Stormont is not new. From 1921 to 1972, Northern Ireland was the only part of the UK with its own semi-autonomous parliament and government, running most domestic affairs in parallel with Westminster under the Government of Ireland Act 1920. Its electoral system gave the Ulster Unionist Party an unbroken majority for half a century, and the civil rights movement of the late 1960s, which campaigned against discrimination in housing, jobs and voting, was met with growing unrest. What followed was unique in modern British history: three decades of sustained political violence within the UK itself. More than 3,500 people were killed and around 47,000 injured during the Troubles, with close to 500 deaths in 1972 alone, the year of Bloody Sunday. That violence brought the old parliament down. It was suspended on 30 March 1972 and replaced with direct rule from London, and an early attempt at power sharing, the Sunningdale executive, lasted only five months in 1974 before collapsing under a loyalist general strike.
This is the backdrop to the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998, brokered by Tony Blair’s Labour government with the Irish government and Northern Ireland’s parties. It ended three decades of the Troubles, was endorsed by 71% of voters in Northern Ireland in a referendum, and remains one of the most significant achievements of modern British politics. It also revived Stormont in a new form: a power-sharing Assembly and Executive, originally of 108 members, in which unionists and nationalists must govern together and key decisions need cross-community support. Powers were transferred on 2 December 1999, the same year Holyrood and the Welsh Assembly opened. The three institutions were built very differently, however, and they have followed very different paths since.
Devolution in Northern Ireland has been on and off from the start. Since powers were first transferred, Stormont has been interrupted six times: four formal suspensions by Westminster and two collapses from within. The Assembly was suspended within months, from February to May 2000, over IRA decommissioning, and then twice more for 24 hours each in August and September 2001, a technical manoeuvre to buy time for electing a First Minister and deputy First Minister. The fourth suspension ran from October 2002 until May 2007, leaving the region under direct rule from Westminster for four and a half years. Policing and justice were devolved to Holyrood from day one but did not reach Stormont until April 2010, after the Hillsborough Castle Agreement. The institutions then collapsed from January 2017 to January 2020 over the Renewable Heat Incentive scandal, and again from February 2022 to February 2024, when the DUP withdrew in protest at the Northern Ireland Protocol and the Irish Sea border. In all, Stormont has been without a functioning Executive for almost ten of its 27 years, around 37% of its existence. Brexit triggered the most recent collapse, yet it landed on an institution that had always been fragile. That raises a question this article returns to: has Westminster done enough since 1998 to build consensus at Stormont, rather than managing each crisis as it comes?
The contrast with Scotland and Wales is clear; Holyrood has sat without interruption since 1999 under a reserved-powers model, where everything not explicitly kept at Westminster has been devolved. It has steadily gained more tax and welfare powers through the Scotland Acts of 2012 and 2016, and has set its own income tax rates and bands since 2017. Wales began with far less, as the original Welsh Assembly could not pass primary legislation at all. It won full law-making powers after a 2011 referendum in which 63.5% voted yes, moved to a reserved-powers model under the Wales Act 2017, and has set Welsh rates of income tax since April 2019. Policing and justice are still reserved to Westminster in Wales, so Northern Ireland is not behind on every measure. The difference is that Cardiff Bay and Holyrood have been able to build their powers steadily, while Stormont has spent much of its life simply trying to stay open. Stormont still has no meaningful tax-varying powers: corporation tax devolution was legislated for in 2015 but has never been brought into force. Understanding the context of historical turmoil is relevant and does compensate for difference between Stormont and Holyrood during their establishment, but the decades of power inequality for Stormont over areas like policing and income-tax variation do not suffice.
That gap is back in focus because of the UK-EU SPS agreement. SPS stands for sanitary and phytosanitary rules, the standards that govern food safety and animal and plant health. Since Brexit, the EU has treated British agri-food goods as third-country imports, which means export health certificates costing up to £200 per consignment, paperwork checks on every load and physical checks on many. Because Northern Ireland stayed inside the EU’s SPS rules under the Protocol, a version of these controls has applied to food, plants and animals moving from Great Britain into Northern Ireland, eased but not removed by the Windsor Framework’s green lane. The deal, first set out as a common understanding at the May 2025 UK-EU summit, would create a common SPS area. Great Britain would follow EU food, animal and plant rules on a dynamic basis, tracking future changes as they are made, with the Court of Justice of the EU as the final authority on EU law and only limited carve-outs. In return, most certificates and routine checks would fall away, both for UK exports to the EU and for goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, including dairy, meat, fish, eggs and plants. Customs declarations on GB to Northern Ireland trade will remain. A draft text was agreed in early November 2026, ahead of the 20 November summit in Brussels. The government puts the benefit at up to £5.1 billion a year for the UK economy by 2040 and has worked towards a mid-2027 start, although industry reports now suggest early 2028 is more likely. The Ulster Farmers’ Union has called the deal a major step forward, while DUP leader Gavin Robinson said it showed a “lack of ambition” (BBC Radio Ulster, 3 November 2026), arguing that Northern Ireland is still treated differently from the rest of the UK, not least because it continues to apply EU customs rules.
The Northern Ireland question: a priority or an afterthought?
Gavin Robinson’s criticism deserves closer attention, because it goes to the heart of the motive for increasingly aligned trade and what these policies actually do for Northern Ireland. Speaking to BBC Radio Ulster on 3 November, he asked: “why do it in a whack-a-mole, single-issue, one-off approach, sector by sector”, rather than ensuring Northern Ireland is treated as part of the entire United Kingdom in negotiations. Looking at the policies of the central government since Brexit, that description fits. It is much more plausible to see the motive behind these policy shifts as the desire for the UK to realign with the EU. The Windsor Framework, the Protocol and the SPS deal all develop the UK’s relationship and alignment with the EU, while improved unity within the UK comes across as a secondary impact.
Robinson’s frustration has a history. In November 2018, Boris Johnson told the DUP conference that no British Conservative government could or should sign up to regulatory checks and customs controls between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Within a year, as Prime Minister, he agreed the Protocol, which did exactly that, replacing Theresa May’s UK-wide backstop with arrangements that left Northern Ireland alone inside EU goods rules. He then told Northern Ireland businesses that anyone asking them to fill in a form should be told to “throw that form in the bin” (Irish News – Johnson NI Protocol remarks). The Protocol took effect on 1 January 2021, and the gap between those promises and the reality of the Irish Sea border did lasting damage to unionist trust in Westminster, contributing directly to the 2022 collapse.
Starmer displayed these motives through organising his summits with the EU during his premiership, seeking to establish a strong relationship and increase cooperation on trade, security and the economy. Rachel Reeves has carried on Starmer’s desires, advocating for a future inside the EU. This is driven by Labour’s Youth Migration Deal, fuelled by Reeves during her place as Chancellor. The development of this policy is still in play, but delayed until Burnham has reached consensus at the upcoming summit on the 20th November. Hence why I pose the question, why does the government advocate so much for EU deals in security, the economy and trade, yet only small, sector-based changes in policy with Northern Ireland?
Reflecting this onto the issue of Northern Irish and British unity, there are other areas of alignment that could be improved in the domestic realm, but these are held back by the priority given to European goals. Jim Allister (MP for North Antrim) raises this similarly to my opinion on devolution during a committee hearing in September: you cannot have laws forced upon a population through dynamic alignment, as this distorts representation and democracy of the public, which will and has led to adversarial political discourse, meaning political stability for Stormont is neither sustainable nor achievable. So how can Northern Ireland develop politically without the necessary powers to do so?
What changes, what doesn’t, and what to watch
These factors will be playing significance in the New Year ahead. Important dates to keep an eye on will be when the SPS deal will kick into effect (mid-2027 at the earliest, possibly slipping into early 2028), when we have Assembly elections coming round the corner (May 2027), and the Stormont Lock (December 2028).
It is extremely important to keep an eye on the Assembly elections in 2027, as the outcome will be a deciding factor on the Stormont Lock. In this case I would care less about the SPS deal- and more about if it sticks. To clarify, this is a vote across Stormont to decide if the post-Brexit arrangements (in articles 5-10) should continue. This is operated by a mechanism which sees 3 outcomes (cross-community, simple majority or failure), each creating a chain of separate events that wield distinguishable impacts on businesses, relations and trade. The first vote, in December 2024, passed by 48 votes to 36 (57%) without the support of a single unionist MLA, which is why the next one comes after four years rather than eight. On the current 90-seat Assembly, where Sinn Féin holds 27 seats, the DUP 25, Alliance 17, the UUP 9 and the SDLP 8, a simple majority for consent looks secure, but cross-community support would need a significant share of unionist MLAs to change position, which none of the unionist parties has signalled. This arithmetic set by the vote will weigh heavily on the factors of customs and the movement of goods, single market rules for goods, VAT, state aid and the electricity market. As discussed, I would take into account the opinions of Northern Irish voices- and context of the countries aspirations- in reflection of this deal.
Now, all sectors’ planning are influenced by the deal, and are depending on the Assembly election and consent vote, but until exact details of the deal take effect, the UK will still operate under the Windsor Framework in full. That means at least seven months, and possibly more than a year, of maintaining compliance before transition.
The stakes are highest for agri-food. Northern Ireland’s food and drink processing sector had a turnover of £6.5 billion in 2022, rising to a provisional £7.1 billion in 2023, and accounts for around 30% of all manufacturing jobs. Agri-food have most to gain from the deal, voiced by the Ulster Farmers’ Union: a huge reduction in certificates and labelling, no routine SPS border checks, and food manufacturers now have autonomy over using either UK or EU business operator addresses on labels for British and EU markets. However, be cautious of the alignment of agri-food rules, as now the UK is on the same playing field, and trade economist Shanker Singham raises concerns over anti-competitive regulation policy influences, such as limits on gene editing.
The retail sector have prevalent opportunities if taken the right way, because the direction of this policy will remove considerable amounts of ‘not for EU’ labelling. This can be used specifically for mainland Britain to revert to Northern Irish customers, and even generally to widen consumer choice. Great Britain is already Northern Ireland’s biggest market in both directions: in 2024, Northern Ireland businesses sold £20.1 billion of goods and services to Great Britain, around half of all their external sales, and bought £16.4 billion from it. Online retail pivots to a different standpoint, as it is currently unclear on the charges of parcels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The EU has introduced a €3 duty on low-value parcels from July 2026 and a €2 handling fee from November 2026, and guidance on how these apply to movements into Northern Ireland has not yet been published.
Non-food manufacturing industries will gain close to nothing, because the deal only covers agri-food. Northern Ireland manufacturers continue to follow EU rules on placing goods on the market, such as the EU’s General Product Safety Regulation, and use CE or UKNI marking, which allows qualifying goods to be sold in Great Britain without the UKCA mark. Every new EU product regulation risks widening the gap with Great Britain, and this is where the Assembly’s Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee and the Stormont Brake come into play. The Product Regulation and Metrology Act 2025 gives ministers the power to align Great Britain with EU product rules, so the real question for manufacturers is whether Great Britain moves towards Northern Ireland or further away from it.
Logistics companies are likely to gain only slightly more. SPS paperwork will fall away, which shrinks the role of the border control posts at Belfast, Larne and Warrenpoint and the work that comes with them, yet customs declarations, entry summary declarations and the Trader Support Service all remain. The systems behind them are fragile too: in September 2026, HMRC had to correct an error in its Customs Declaration Service that wrongly charged ‘at risk’ tariffs on some goods moving into Northern Ireland. With more than £16 billion of purchases flowing from Great Britain each year, even small frictions add up. For every sector, then, the lesson is the same. The SPS deal lowers the Irish Sea border for food, it does not remove it, and whether even that much survives depends on the 2027 election and the 2028 vote.
Louis Dolamore is a research assistant at DTM Public Affairs Ltd











