Building on from last week’s blog, Gabriella Franklin explores land use, jobs, battery minerals and safety in the UK’s net-zero transition.
In our previous post, we tackled common misconceptions about renewable energy, from costs and reliability to environmental impacts. As the rollout of clean energy accelerates, the conversation is now shifting from “does it work?” to “where does it go?” and “what is it made of?” In this second instalment, we turn to five more myths that sit at the heart of the transition’s social dimension, from land use and workforce change to the lifecycle impacts of new technologies, highlighting the trade-offs policymakers and stakeholders must navigate and the importance of assessing them through an ESG lens.
Claim 6: “Solar farms are displacing UK agricultural land”
Solar energy requires land, however its overall footprint in the UK remains relatively little. The most detailed analysis to date, from Lancaster University, shows that ground-mounted solar occupies around 0.06-0.07% of total UK land, less than golf courses. While much of this land was previously agricultural, a significant share consists of lower-grade arable land (often with a very, very low biodiversity index), improved grassland or non-farm sites such as former quarries, landfills and collieries.
Looking ahead, even an ambitious solar expansion would use a limited proportion of land. Scenarios that combine rooftop and ground-mounted deployment suggest solar would require around 0.22-0.39% of UK land to meet its share of a 100% non-fossil energy mix, while a fully ground-mounted approach would rise to approximately 0.72% of total land, or about 1.5% of agricultural land. Efficiency gains, biodiversity buffers and dual-use designs can reduce these requirements further. Agri-PV projects, for example, allow grazing or crop production beneath raised panels, providing farmers with additional income while maintaining food production.
That said, concerns about where solar is being built are well-founded. Research by the Campaign to Protect Rural England shows that over half of England’s largest operational solar farms include “best and most versatile” agricultural land, with applications often concentrated in particular regions. In some areas, communities have raised objections to clusters of developments, citing cumulative landscape impacts, the long-term loss of high-grade farmland and pressure on local grid infrastructure that may not align with wider energy system needs.
These are not arguments against solar itself, but against poorly coordinated deployment. National data shows solar uses very little land overall, yet local experience can look very different where planning, grid access and land-use policy are misaligned. Addressing this requires clearer spatial planning, stronger protection for the most productive farmland, and a greater emphasis on rooftops, brownfield sites and lower-grade land.
Claim 7: “The transition to renewables will destroy jobs”
Concerns that the transition to renewables will lead to widespread job losses are both prevalent and understandable, particularly given historical experience. The closure of coalfields across the UK in the 1980s left deep and lasting economic and social scars in many communities, illustrating the consequences of poorly managed industrial change. However, while the shift away from fossil fuels will undoubtedly reshape parts of the labour market, it is also expected to create substantial new opportunities. Research shows that investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency generates more jobs than fossil fuel sectors across manufacturing, installation, maintenance, operations, policy, and research.
National Grid projections indicate that by 2050, the Net Zero Energy Workforce will be made up of 400,000 people, 260,000 of these positions will be additional, many will be located in regions with major renewable and nuclear investments, such as the North and South West.
Nonetheless, meeting this demand faces challenges, notably a green skills gap that has widened in recent years, this remains the central constraint. While many capabilities are transferable from the oil and gas sector, the UK currently employs roughly 270,000 people in that industry, significantly fewer than the number of roles required across clean energy. Moreover, a substantial proportion of oil and gas workers will retire over the coming decade. Addressing this gap will require a deliberate, just transition approach, with both government and the private sector playing a proactive role through coordinated investment in reskilling, regional economic support, and clear workforce pathways. The experience of coalfield closures serves as a reminder of the social costs of unmanaged change and of the importance of getting this transition right.
Claim 8: “Battery mineral extraction is as damaging as fossil fuels”
As mentioned at the end of the previous blog, mining for minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths is essential for batteries, wind turbines, and solar panels, and can have real environmental and social impacts. For example, artisanal cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been linked to unsafe working conditions, and large-scale rare earth mining can produce toxic waste and disrupt ecosystems.
However, the scale of extraction required for a renewable transition is far smaller and more manageable than the ongoing extraction and combustion of fossil fuels. The Energy Transitions Commission estimates that all refined metals needed to reach net zero by 2050 will total less than the amount of coal mined in a single year.
Battery materials are also largely recyclable. Lithium-ion batteries, wind turbine blades, and solar panels can be reused, refurbished, or processed to recover metals, creating a long-term “closed-loop” system. For instance, studies suggest that by mid-century, over 95% of mined battery minerals could be continually recycled, significantly reducing the need for new extraction. Recently, EDF announced that it is going to recycle turbine blades into fence posts, benches, and pathways.
Global supply is also increasing. Lithium reserves grew 52% between 2021 and 2024, and new technologies, including sodium-based batteries and lower-cobalt chemistries, further reduce reliance on scarcer or higher-risk minerals. Meanwhile, fossil fuels require constant extraction and consumption, with a continuous cycle of environmental damage, air pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions.
Nonetheless, responsible sourcing is critical. Mining projects must respect Indigenous rights, protect local ecosystems, and follow strict environmental standards. Yet even accounting for these challenges, the environmental and social costs of battery and renewable mineral production are far lower than the ongoing impacts of coal, oil, and gas.
Claim 9: “Battery storage systems pose fire risks”
Battery energy storage systems (BESS) use lithium-ion technology and, like any energy infrastructure, can present hazards if not properly engineered or managed. Thermal runaway, a rapid self-heating process that can lead to fire, is a known risk in lithium-ion batteries.
However, much of the concern is shaped by early-stage incidents. A number of these occurred when the sector was still nascent, regulatory frameworks were less developed and operational experience was limited. Some early fires involved non-lithium-ion chemistries. Others were linked to poor labour practices, including cable terminations and operations and maintenance standards, rather than inherent flaws in the technology itself.
Emergency response practices have also evolved. In some early cases, inappropriate interventions, such as spraying water on lithium-ion batteries before they had fully overheated, unintentionally increased risks by generating hydrogen and creating explosive conditions. Guidance and training have since improved significantly.
Real-world data reflect this learning curve. According to the Electric Power Research Institute’s global incident database, failure rates for utility-scale grid storage fell by approximately 97% between 2018 and 2023, despite exponential growth in deployment.
In the UK, regulatory oversight has strengthened alongside deployment, including updated planning guidance, health-and-safety standards and collaboration across industry and departments such as DEFRA. Modern systems now incorporate clearer safety standards, improved engineering controls and more mature operational practices.
As with all large-scale energy infrastructure, risk exists. The evidence suggests that as standards and experience have improved, those risks have become better understood and increasingly well managed.
Claim 10: “Batteries have short lifespans”
Battery lifespan concerns often come from consumer electronics experiences rather than utility‑grade systems. In reality, commercial and grid‑scale energy storage systems are routinely backed by 10-15 year warranties, reflecting confidence in performance and durability over extended cycles.
Beyond first life, batteries can enjoy “second‑life” applications: electric vehicle batteries that are no longer suited to automotive duty often retain 70-80% of their original capacity after 10-15 years. They can be repurposed for grid balancing, frequency response, and peak‑shaving applications, and in domestic storage systems, sometimes paired with solar PV, often at a lower cost than new batteries.
Second‑life markets are projected to grow significantly as EV adoption expands, creating an additional layer of utility before recycling. Meanwhile, battery recycling capacity is increasing in Europe and beyond, with major facilities being established that recover lithium, cobalt, nickel, and other materials for reuse, reducing the need for new raw extraction and extending the life cycle of valuable minerals. These technologies are becoming far more sophisticated and less energy-intensive. Recycling plants with mechanical processes are now being built, which save much of the plastics and other chemical components, regenerating the battery rather than melting it down to create it again.
Climate risk is now financially material
Across markets and policy alike, one theme cuts through the issues explored in this series, climate change is no longer only an environmental concern but a core question of economic and financial risk and economic resilience, increasingly recognised by the institutions that allocate global capital. “Momentum is building globally for a second Bretton Woods Conference to redesign the financial system around climate risk,” says PLG Advisory Board member Toby Read of Ion Ventures. Lenders and insurance companies are under increasing pressure to operate with more action around the system-wide impacts of their operations (United Nations, 2019; UNPRI, n.d.). In March 2025, the Norwegian sovereign wealth bank, Norges Bank Investment Management, placed 96% of its $1.6tn portfolio value under natural capital risk assessment. This means the bank sees 96% of its portfolio value at risk from climate and environmental change (Reuters, 2025).
Read adds that the risk of climate change-induced wildfires, which have dramatically affected asset value and financial returns, has not been brought into scope quickly enough. He cites the example of Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), which filed for bankruptcy after the 2019 California wildfires caused around $30 billion in damage to its assets. Sufficient insurance was not in place to cover the extent of the damage, nor could a consortium of reinsurers cover the cost. As climate considerations move to the centre of economic and financial decision-making, the way we debate energy policy takes on greater importance.
In this context, public opinion about energy policy matters. Decisions about renewables, storage and net zero involve real trade-offs between land uses, technologies, costs and timelines. A healthy democratic conversation depends on recognising those trade-offs honestly, while grounding discussion in evidence rather than assumption. The UK’s energy transition will succeed not because differing opinions are silenced, but because concerns are addressed with clarity and transparency. Dedicating more time and attention to evidence-based discussions on renewables that carefully consider the secondary impacts at the international, national and local level, is therefore not a distraction from the transition, it is a necessary part of making it work.